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Abstract Exposure to airborne biological hazards in an ever
expanding urban transport infrastructure and highly diverse
mobile population is of growing concern, in terms of both
public health and biosecurity. The existing policies and prac-
tices on design, construction and operation of these infrastruc-
tures may have severe implications for airborne disease trans-
mission, particularly, in the event of a pandemic or intentional
release of biological of agents. This paper reviews existing
knowledge on airborne disease transmission in different
modes of transport, highlights the factors enhancing the vul-
nerability of transport infrastructures to airborne disease trans-
mission, discusses the potential protection measures and iden-
tifies the research gaps in order to build a bioresilient transport
infrastructure. The unification of security and public health
research, inclusion of public health security concepts at the
design and planning phase, and a holistic system approach
involving all the stakeholders over the life cycle of transport
infrastructure hold the key to mitigate the challenges posed by
biological hazards in the twenty-first century transport
infrastructure.
Keywords Biological hazards . Transport . Vulnerability .
Protectionmeasures
Introduction
In the twenty-first century, the nature and extent of human
interaction in different built environments can have a pro-
found impact on public health. Today, we spend nearly 90 %
of our time indoors in a variety of enclosed microenviron-
ments (Buonanno et al. 2014). In broader terms, the built
environment refers to any physical alteration of the natural
environment through human-made structures to shelter, per-
form and protect their activities, ranging from dwelling and
work places to recreational facilities and their supporting in-
frastructure. The development and expansion of transport in-
frastructures, especially in mega cities, has led to increased
mobility of people. Today, a vast proportion of the working
population spend a significant time commuting in public
transport and exposure to airborne pathogens in these in-
transit microenvironments is of major concern. For example,
in the UK, use of public transport has increased from 9 to 11%
since 1995/97 to 2012 (DfT, 2013). However, the principles
and practices in design, construction, operation and manage-
ment of different built environments vary across the globe
depending on a variety of factors (economic, social, political,
technological and climatic) (Nasir, 2014), resulting in a range
of exposure pathways and scenarios around biological hazards
in these environments.
Transport built environments are subject to an array of
indoor air contaminants derived from outdoor sources, build-
ing materials, furnishings, consumer products and occupant
activities. These include a cocktail of particles, gases, vapours,
biological agents and their derivatives. Of these, biological
agents are of the greatest concern due to their allergenic, toxic
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and infectious potential. Enclosed environments can provide
ecological niches and transmission pathways for a wide range
of pathogens. Indeed, indoor environments are complex
ecosystems in which there is a complicated relationship be-
tween humans, microorganisms, physical environment and
structures (Nazaroff, 2016; Kelley and Gilbert, 2013;
Kembel et al. 2012, 2014). Biological agents are ubiquitous
in ambient environments and can enter into transport built
environments through a number of routes: heating ventilation
and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, doors, windows, at-
tachment to people and objects, water infrastructure and via
infected individuals and animals.
It has been recognised that overcrowding in small enclosed
spaces, inadequate ventilation, recirculation of contaminated
air, increased duration of exposure and susceptibility of ex-
posed people increase the likelihood of airborne disease trans-
mission (Nardell, 2016; Canadian Tuberculosis Committee,
2007; Li et al. 2007; Wanyeki et al. 2006). These can be
influenced, to a varying degree, by design, management and
operational practices in different environments. While the de-
sign and construction of the man-made enclosed spaces may
be intrinsic, their operation and management is strongly influ-
enced by a wide range of factors.
Airborne disease transmission in the built environment is a
complex process, and acquisition and transmission of patho-
gens is the end result of successful interaction between infec-
tious agents (reservoir), hosts and transmission pathways (en-
vironment). Various elements of design, construction, use and
management of different built environments can significantly
impact these sub systems (sources, hosts, transmission path-
ways). Figure 1 illustrates how these may influence airborne
disease transmission. It can be argued that the way we design,
construct, operate, manage and behave inside different trans-
port built environments can have a substantial impact on our
risk of exposure to biological hazards as well as creating new
exposure pathways.
In recent times, we have witnessed the emergence of new
diseases (e.g. influenza H1N1 and severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS)) and their potential to cause huge damage
to societies across the globe (Holmes and Rambaut, 2004;
Neumann et al. 2009). Additionally, re-emerging airborne in-
fectious diseases, for instance, tuberculosis (TB), have a
worldwide public health impact. In 2013, there were 9 million
incident cases worldwide and multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-
TB), extensively drug-resistant TB (XDR-TB) and TB/HIV
co-epidemics are serious global health concerns (WHO,
2014). It is of note that the majority of TB incidents were in
Southeast Asia, Africa and Western Pacific regions. The pub-
lic transport built environments in such countries with a high
burden of TB together with poor airborne disease control mea-
sures may become hubs for the airborne spread of disease. The
intentional release of biological agents is also of growing con-
cern (Cogliati et al. 2016). The 2001 bioterror incidents using
spores of Bacillus anthracis in the USA (Canter et al. 2005)
and failed bioattacks by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan (Danzig
et al. 2012) offer evidence of this. Aum Shinrikyo had devel-
oped a biological and chemical weapon programme and made
several failed bioattacks by weaponizing Clostridium
botulinum and B. anthracis. However, in 1995, the same
group released sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system,
resulting in 12 deaths and over 5000 injuries (Okumura et al.
1996). Anthrax, though cannot be transmitted between
humans, however has the potential to be used as a bioweapon.
As early as 1953, the Ministry of Defence in the UK held tests
to determine the vulnerability of the public transport to bio-
logical attack. Initially, the effects of motion and ventilation on
bioaerosol dispersion were investigated, and in 1963, bacteria
were released in the London Underground. This latter trial
indicated that the spores can be carried for several miles on
the tube system (DERA, 1999).
At present, we are living with a constant risk of an influ-
enza pandemic, and this could have a significant effect on
global public health (WHO, 2013). Additionally, transport
infrastructure (railway stations, bus stations, underground
trains, airports, etc.) has a high relative risk to a bioterrorist
attack due to its profile, occupancy and vulnerability. There is
a greater risk of exposure to airborne pathogens and likely
acquisition of infection and downstream transmission of dis-
ease to the wider public due to the special characteristics of
various transport means and their hubs (e.g. high population
density, close interaction and complicated people movements,
interconnectedness of transport network). There have been
growing efforts to numerically model the risk of airborne dis-
ease transmission and propagation in both global and local
transport networks (Lawyer, 2016; Zhang et al. 2016;
Andrews et al. 2013; Perez and Dragicevic, 2009; Yang
et al. 2008). It is fair to argue that the uncertainty about when
a pandemic or bioterror attack may occur and the unpredict-
ability about the severity of such an incident leave no option
but to prepare in advance. Therefore, it is time to rethink the
role of transport built environments in airborne disease trans-
mission. Specifically, we need to ask the following: What are
the existing practices in design, construction, use and manage-
ment in these environments and their implications in airborne
disease transmission? Are we inadvertently creating a trans-
port infrastructure which facilitates exposure to airborne bio-
logical hazards? What may be needed to prevent a drug-
resistant disease to spread from person to person versus
preventing a terrorist attack? What should be the main focus
in design and management? What are the potential research
areas to focus on in order to enhance the resilience of transport
infrastructure to biological hazards?
This paper aims to review the existing evidence on disease
transmission in transport built environments with a view to
highlight the factors increasing the vulnerability of them to
disease transmission, discuss the potential protection
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measures and identify future direction for research to enhance
the resilience of transport infrastructures to biological hazards.
This will not only add to the knowledge on the current
vulnerability of both occupants and transport infrastructure
to airborne disease transmission, but also assist in identifying
the gaps where interventions can be made to build a
bioresilient transport infrastructure. In addition, it can inform
the future research agenda to allow us to anticipate, prepare
for, and control future epidemic outbreaks or intentional re-
lease of biological agents in critical infrastructure.
State of the art
Overall, the scientific literature on airborne infection transmis-
sion in various transport hubs and transport means is limited.
Reports are available on air/droplet disease transmission (TB,
SARS, influenza, measles) during commercial air travel. A
review on transmission of respiratory infections during air
travel by Ledler and Newman (2005) provides a detailed
knowledge on aircraft cabin environment/operation and re-
ports on outbreaks of respiratory illness. They concluded that
due to existing guidelines from theWorld Health Organisation
(WHO) for prevention and control of respiratory illness during
air travel and controlled cabin environments (e.g. up to 20 air
changes per hour and HEPA filtration), the overall risk due to
air/droplet borne disease transmission is low. However, the
proximity to the source and duration of exposure increases
the risk. The stage of illness and size of aircraft were also
mentioned as influencing factors. SARS outbreaks during air
travel highlighted the likely airborne transmission and a wider
zone of high-risk environment than indicated by theWHO and
other organisations (e.g. an increased risk of transmission is
associated with sitting within two rows of an infected person
for more than 8 h). Similar conclusions were drawn in another
review of infectious disease transmission during commercial
air travel by Mangili and Gendreau (2005). With reference to
transmission of TB during commercial air travel, a systematic
review by Abubakar (2010) highlighted the limited evidence
on TB transmission.
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(ECDC) has extensively reviewed the literature on infectious
disease transmission in aircraft, assessed the risk associated
with transmission of different infectious agents onboard air-
craft and formulated guidelines on their control (Leitmeyer,
2011). These have highlighted that although available litera-
ture suggests the frequent transmission of TB, influenza,
SARS, meningococcal disease and measles, there is scarcity
of data on confirmed on board transmission of infectious dis-
eases. Infectivity of index case, susceptibility of contacts and
effectiveness of exposure in terms of proximity, duration and
cabin air quality were identified as factors influencing on-
board transmission of infectious diseases. Recently, an
Australian study to quantify the risk of measles transmission
on aeroplanes during 2007–2011 found that risk was not as-
sociated with seating proximity (Hoad et al. 2013). Likewise,
Young et al. (2014) concluded proximity had no impact on the
risk of infection by influenza. A report on influenza transmis-
sion on aircraft by Moser et al. (1979) illustrated the signifi-
cance of ventilation. In this case, an aircraft was delayed for
Fig. 1 Factors influencing
airborne disease transmission in
transport infrastructure
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3 h in an Alaskan airport and remained on the ground with the
ventilation system turned off. Seventy-two of the 54 passen-
gers developed influenza due to one index patient on board.
Consequently, it is now recommended that adequate ventila-
tion must be supplied in ground delays of more than 30 min.
A number of studies on respiratory infection (influenza,
TB, Legionella) in ship travel (passenger, cargo, naval) have
been reported (Beyrer et al. 2007; Brotherton et al. 2003; CDC
2010; Jernigan et al. 1996; Joseph et al. 2007; Kak, 2007;
Kura et al. 2006; Lim, 2011; Schlaich et al. 2009; Tarabbo
et al., 2011; Vera et al. 2014; Ward et al., 2010). Isolated
environments with close interaction among a large number
of individuals and shared facilities (water and air condition-
ing) have been identified as factors that increase the risk of
exposure to airborne infections in these settings. A typical
example of airborne infect ion is an outbreak of
Legionnaires’ disease. Here, the most common environmental
factors that elevate the risk of exposure are contaminated wa-
ter supply systems, spas and pools and air handling systems
(Beyrer et al. 2007; Jernigan et al. 1996; Kak, 2007; Kura et al.
2006). Spread of TB is another example of airborne infection
transmission. A study byHouk (1980) on TB spread in a naval
ship concluded that infection transmission was due to rapidly
and evenly dispersed infectious droplet nuclei throughout a
closed environment with a recirculation ventilation system.
Lim (2011) has noted proximity and social interaction among
a large number of people, long duration of cruises, mixing of
passengers from Southern and Northern hemispheres and ar-
rival of new susceptible passengers on subsequent journey
legs as specific vulnerabilities of cruise ships to influenza.
With reference to ground transport, a review byMohr et al.
2012 has reported 14 events of airborne infection transmission
in public transport (commuter buses, school buses, train). Of
these, eleven were of TB, two were meningococcal and one
involved measles and most of these were in school buses.
Additionally, the authors have also presented non-scientific
literature (Google News, Google Scholar, GENIOS and
World News) on airborne infection in public transport (eight
events on TB, SARS, meningococcal disease and Rubella).
Poor ventilation (windows and doors closed due to outside
weather), ventilation systems (recirculation), proximity to in-
dex cases (crowding) were found as environmental factors
influencing the risk of airborne infection transmission on pub-
lic ground transport. Similarly, a systematic review on TB
transmission on public transport (school buses, train, commut-
er van) has reported that contact investigations on these con-
veyances found a positive tuberculin skin test (TST) in 10–
78 % of the persons travelling with the index case (Edelson
and Phypers, 2011). They also highlighted that poor ventila-
tion, closed ventilation systems and proximity to index cases
increases the risk of exposure to TB. Studies from countries
with high TB incidence has shown that public transportation
(often crowded and poorly ventilated) may play a critical role
in transmission and sustaining TB infection (Andrews et al.
2013; Horna-Campos et al. 2010, 2007). A case control study
from Nottingham, UK, has shown that recent use of public
buses and trams is a significant individual risk factor for the
acquisition of acute respiratory infection (leading to GP con-
sultation) in winter (Troko et al., 2011). Reports have impli-
cated the role of train travel during the 2009 influenza A
(H1N1) pandemic (Cui et al. 2011; Pestre et al. 2012).
Numerical modelling studies have also been carried out to
quantify the risk of airborne infection (Furuya, 2007), disper-
sion of infectious droplets in trains (Zhang and Li, 2012) and
propagation of airborne disease via public transport at city
level (Zhang et al. 2016). No publications were found on
airborne infection transmission on the underground or in any
of the transport hubs such as stations or airports. In a review
on health and safety hazards associated with subways,
Gershon et al. (2005) remarked that although infectious dis-
ease transmission in subways is conceivable, this has not been
documented. While more recently, Zhao et al. (2015) have
utilised urban subway mobility data to model the risk of an
epidemic transmission via the Beijing subway.
Vulnerability of transport infrastructure to airborne
disease transmission
The available literature on airborne infectious disease trans-
mission in transport built environments, though scanty, offers
valuable knowledge on factors enhancing risk of exposure to
biological hazards. Although the existing literature is not suf-
ficient to quantify the association of different environmental
factors to disease transmission in transport built environments,
it can be used to develop a qualitative vulnerability profile of
transport built environments to airborne disease transmission
(Fig. 2).
In transport built environments, humans and environmental
sources (mobile and fixed) are the major reservoir of biolog-
ical agents. Respiratory droplets produced by infected individ-
uals during different expiratory activities (talking, singing,
coughing, and sneezing) may contain pathogens. These drop-
lets either settle or remain suspended in the air as droplet
nuclei depending on their composition and size at the time
of release and hygrothermal condition of the built environ-
ment. These are subject to same aerodynamic processes that
govern abiotic particles in an enclosed space (Nazaroff, 2016).
Small droplet nuclei (<5 μm) can remain suspended in the air
for a long duration due to their low settling rates and can be
transported to other areas away from the source (e.g. by air
currents or recirculation ventilation). The settled droplets (in-
cluding those larger than 5 μm) contaminate the surfaces and
may transfer to susceptible hosts by surface-borne pathways
or resuspend again after evaporation. Type and frequency of
respiratory activities, site of infection, pathogen load and type
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are critical factors that affect the probability of infection trans-
mission by the airborne route (Gralton et al. 2011). The po-
tential environmental sources include but are not limited to
HVAC systems, water reservoirs and distribution systems,
maintenance activities and contaminated surfaces. In addition,
deliberate release of infectious agents in any transport mode or
hub have great potential to start the chain of airborne infection
transmission.
It is worth highlighting that in addition to the airborne
route, the dispersion and transfer of infectious agents deposit-
ed on various surfaces/materials/matrix (e.g. skin or in respi-
ratory secretions, to hands and/or to high-touch surfaces—
doorknobs, staircase railings, seats, escalator hand rails, chair
arms, grab rails, cash machines, phone, ticket machines) also
offer a major transmission pathway. For example, studies have
shown the contamination of public buses in twomajor cities in
Portugal withMRSA (Conceição et al. 2013). In fact, it can be
argued that successful airborne infection transmission from
source to susceptible host is a complex and multifaceted pro-
cess which can involve both airborne and surface borne path-
ways and it is difficult to disentangle the two.
Proximity to infectious source and duration of exposure are
the major variables in risk of airborne disease transmission. In
various modes of transport and their hubs, the duration of
exposure to infections sources can be highly variable. It may
involve a single trip (long or short) or multiple trips (repeated/
cumulative exposure). The WHO recommends the contact
tracing of the individuals who were in close proximity (within
two rows) of an infectious TB person for more than 8 h during
air travel (WHO 2008). However, transmission during short
but intensive and repeated exposure (e.g. school and mini
buses) in ground transport has been reported (Golub et al.
2001; Horna-Campos et al. 2007; Mohr et al. 2012). This
clearly highlights that successful airborne infection transmis-
sion can occur during short exposure periods depending on
the characteristics of infectious source (pathogen load), host
(susceptibility) and environment (proximity, pathogen con-
centrations). However, the relationship among these variables
remains poorly understood.
Crowding is a common feature in various transport modes
and transport hubs. For example, at present, London is facing
chronic overcrowding on public transport, especially during
peak rush hours. The results of a survey (Spring 2011) by the
Department for Transport (DfT) revealed that the top ten over-
crowded services were between 47 and 66 % over their ca-
pacity limit (DfT, 2011). Not only are the train carriages over-
crowded but also the stations. During the rush hours, com-
muters are sitting and/or standing in close proximity under
poorly ventilated conditions and this may have serious impli-
cations for airborne disease transmission. For instance, travel-
ling with symptomatic individuals, especially during pan-
demics, in crowded and poorly ventilated public transport
could increase the risk of infection transmission via direct
and indirect contact.
Protection measures
Despite the limited knowledge on quantitative association
among different elements of design, construction, use and
management with airborne disease transmission in transport
built environments, the available evidence emphasises their
vulnerability to different airborne biological hazards. A range
of protection measures are available to improve the resilience
of transport built environments to airborne biological hazards.
Fig. 2 Vulnerability profile of
transport infrastructure to
airborne disease transmission
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The approach to minimise the risk of acquisition of airborne
infection entails deployment of control measures that break the
chain of transmission. A good body of knowledge is available
on airborne infection control technologies and strategies for
enclosed spaces, particularly, in health care built environments
(Kowalski, 2012; Azimi and Stephens, 2013). These can be
adapted to transport built environments. These include admin-
istrative, environmental/engineering and personal protection.
Administrative controls are comprised of policies and proce-
dures and their implementation to reduce opportunities for in-
fection occurrences and cross infection. Environmental/
engineering controls focus on reducing the concentration of
infectious agents and are either integrated into HVAC systems
or installed/fixed in indoor spaces. Additionally, there has been
a growing literature on use and efficacy of these technologies in
portable devices (Verhougstraete and Reynolds, 2016; Boyce,
2016; Gunschera et al. 2015; Zuraimi et al. 2011; Zhang et al.
2011; Chen et al. 2010; Grinshpun et al., 2007). Personal pro-
tection controls are used in high-risk environments and emer-
gency scenarios where administrative and environmental con-
trols cannot adequately offer protection. Figure 3 depicts the
hierarchy of control measure to enhance resilience of transport
infrastructure to airborne biological threats.
Due to growing international travel and the emergence of
diseases with potential to be global public health threats, the
WHO has revised International Health Regulations (IHR)
which were adopted in May 2005 and entered into force on
June 2007. These offer guidelines towards prevention, protec-
tion, control and public health response to global spread of
disease without compromising international trade and traffic
(WHO 2005). A recent report by the Airport Cooperative
Research Programme (ACRP) evaluated the risk of infectious
disease transmission via droplet, airborne and contact modes
within airports and aboard aircrafts and identified 24 mitiga-
tion measures classified into three broad categories: buildings,
airplanes and people (TRB, 2013). This report recommended
the use of hand sanitizer stations at strategic locations inside
buildings, use of broad spectrum disinfectants, availability of
biohazard kits, hand-free bathroom appliances, hand-free
transaction tools and appropriate operation and maintenance
of HVAC systems (ventilation, filtration). The use of upper
room ultraviolet light (UVC), especially for high-risk (quar-
antine, isolation) and high-density areas (queuing areas), was
also suggested. For aeroplanes, the mitigation measures in-
cluded decreasing ventilation downtime (e.g. parked at gate),
availability of biohazard kits, use of hand sanitizer during and
after the flight and use of broad spectrum disinfectants. With
reference to people, the highly recommended actions were
implementing campaigns on becoming a healthy traveller
and healthy worker and on seasonal influenza vaccination
and hand hygiene/cough/sneeze etiquette.
In order to prevent inanimate surfaces acting as reservoirs
of pathogenic organisms, the use of antimicrobial coatings on
different high-touch surfaces is also gaining attention. A range
of coatings/polymers have been tested on different surfaces—
plastic, glass, steel, natural leather (Wei et al. 2014; Pollini
et al. 2013), and a growing body of evidence is available on
the efficacy of antimicrobial coatings, particularly, in health
care built environment (Boyce, 2016; Casey et al. 2010; Page
et al. 2009). At present, a range of antimicrobial coatings has
been marketed and can be adopted appropriately to different
transport microenvironments. The use of antimicrobial copper
has been reported at border control counters at the Arturo
Merino Benítez airport and metro train network in Chile
(Copper Development Association, 2013, 2014). Surfaces in
the Hong Kong metro have been coated with nano-based dis-
infectants (Davies, 2007).
Taylor et al. (2013) reviewed different risk assessment
methodologies, guidelines, recommendations and tools/
software to assess, prevent and mitigate the potential impact
of building vulnerability to bioterror attacks. They introduce a
framework to classify different protection measures and high-
light the inter relationship between different protection mea-
sures and their impact on overall building vulnerability and
resilience to bioterror attack. Recently, the Federal Highway
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, has de-
veloped a learning tool to inform transportation agencies
about plans and responses in biohazard events. The tool con-
tains detailed information about potential biohazard agents,
events, release scenarios in different modes of transport,
existing guidelines and analytical tools framing emergency
response to biohazard events in different transport modes
and identified various information system technologies to en-
hance preparedness and response actions (FHWA, 2015).
Preventing, mitigating, monitoring and responding to biolog-
ical threats in transport infrastructure is a complex task and
requires a multidisciplinary alliance to design and implement
appropriate protection measures which must be informed by
venue and scenario rather than supply driven. Facility man-
agement departments/divisions have a major role in ensuring
the operation and efficacy of various control measures.
Particular attention is required to keep in view the interactions
and interdependencies between different components of trans-
port infrastructure in order to overcome any unintended con-
sequences of a control measure.
Potential research areas
In the twenty-first century, we are facing threats from a range
of airborne biological hazards (e.g. pandemics, natural disas-
ters, bioweapons). The social and economic impact of inci-
dents of influenza pandemic, SARS outbreak and anthrax at-
tacks in the recent past clearly highlight the scale of threat to
humanity from biohazards. The critical role of transport infra-
structures in the healthy functioning of an urban environment
15762 Environ Sci Pollut Res (2016) 23:15757–15766
puts it at a higher risk to biohazards and warrants a need to
develop and adopt such tool/strategies/protection measure that
inform and assist in building bioresilience to transport infra-
structure. In recent times, a rapid change in policies, laws, and
standards has been seen due to growing international concerns
about the impact of built environments on natural resource
depletion and degradation, waste generation and accumula-
tion, ecosystems and global warming. Consequently, energy
efficiency and sustainability has emerged as a guiding para-
digm for twenty-first century built environments. The growing
emphasis on energy efficiency and the resultant changes in
design, construction and operation of various transport built
environments (e.g. airtight structure, high space usage effi-
ciency) may lead to increased vulnerability of these built en-
vironments to airborne disease transmission. We believe to
move towards ‘healthy transport infrastructure’ health and
well-being of occupants and environmental hygiene should
be the primary objective of all the policies and regulations,
and this entails a collaboration among policy makers, archi-
tecture/engineering/construction industry, manufacturers and
vendors supplying the building technologies, systems, prod-
ucts and materials and public health officials.
Over the last decade, a growing body of knowledge has
been created on airborne biological contaminants in built
environments primarily on two independent streamlines by
biosecurity experts and public health practitioners. But is it
possible to build bioresilient cities by taking such an
approach? In our view, the challenges posed by biological
hazards in today’s world are multifaceted, and surely, such a
divided approach is bound to fail. This situation calls for uni-
fication of security and public health research scholarship—
public health security. What is needed is a holistic system
approach involving close interaction among all the stake-
holders (architects, urban planners, public health practitioners,
biosecurity experts, law experts). It is vital to incorporate the
concept of public health security into the life cycle phases of
critical urban infrastructures, including transport, from design
and planning to upgrading/decommissioning.
Despite the growing knowledge on dynamics of airborne
disease transmission in transport infrastructures, there are cer-
tain areas which need focus in order to develop a public health
security index for critical urban infrastructure and an integrat-
ed tool box (with tools for exclusion, detection, mitigation,
response, decontamination) for public health security.
Table 1 shows the areas to be developed under a future re-
search agenda in order to improve public health security.
Conclusions
The design, construction, use and management of transport
infrastructures, in particular, public transportation systems/
hubs, can greatly impact airborne disease transmission. The
environmental conditions and human interaction within dif-
ferent means of transport and their associated built environ-
ments can lead to successful transmission of airborne diseases.
The advancement in means of international travel, in particu-
lar, air travel, may facilitate and influence the propagation of
already known pathogens and emergence of new pathogens.
International transport hubs hold the potential to act as hubs
for the global spread of airborne diseases such as SARS and
H1N1 influenza. Additionally, their critical role and operation
in urban environments also make them a high-risk infrastruc-
ture to bioterror attack.
Fig. 3 Hierarchy of control
measures to enhance resilience of
transport infrastructure to
airborne biological hazards
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In general, the literature on airborne infection transmission
in various transport infrastructures is limited and mainly
focused on commercial air travel. However, the available
knowledge offers valuable insights on potential factors en-
hancing risk of exposure to biological hazards in transport
infrastructure. This can be translated to develop a qualitative
vulnerability profile of different transport built environments
and to design intervention strategies to enhance resilience to-
wards airborne biological hazards. Breaking the chain of in-
fection transmission is critical to the success of any airborne
infection control intervention and knowledge and practices
from health care built environments to control airborne infec-
tion (administrative, environmental/engineering and personal
protection) can be of great relevance to transport built
environments.
In the wake of new and emerging diseases, the rising num-
ber of drug-resistant pathogens and an ever looming threat of
bioweapons the vulnerability of transport infrastructures to
airborne disease transmission can have severe implications.
Hence, it is time to redefine the concept of national security
and public health by bringing these two in close interaction in
order to build bioresilient cities. A holistic system approach,
which takes into account all the factors influencing airborne
disease transmission in transport infrastructures, can surely
advance our capabilities to enhance prophylactic public health
security management. By designing and implementation of
sustainable interventions, we can not only reduce the current
vulnerability of transport infrastructures to airborne disease
transmission, but also better prepare for future biological
threats, both epidemic outbreaks and bioterror attacks.
Table 1 Highlights of future
research areas and research focus Research area Research focus
Transmission of airborne disease or release
of biological agents of concern
What are the mechanisms of airborne disease transmission in
transport infrastructures?
What is the role of different environmental factors in
transmission?
To what extent do various design and operation practices provide
or limit exposure pathways to airborne biological hazards?
Human environment interaction What are the flow patterns of people and their interactions within
transport infrastructures (how many, where, how long)?
What are the characteristics of high-risk space-people
interaction?
How can we gauge the relationship of complexity and
interconnectivity of urban transport infrastructures and the
exposure pathways to biological hazards?
Hazard analysis and critical control points Which methods/tools are required to predict the spread of
biological agents and identify critical control points and their
spatio-temporal dispersion in urban transport infrastructures?
Public health security and ethics How can the biosecurity agenda serve the public health agenda?
What ethical issues need to be considered in surveillance for
biological threats?
Detection and diagnostics of biological
hazards
Development of rapid detection of airborne biological hazards
Development of attributed systems of biological detection
Instrumentation to facilitate measurement of individual exposure
during use of transport infrastructures
Mathematical modelling Airborne dispersion of biological agents in transport specific
infrastructures and resultant public health impact.
Modelling of passenger movement and proximity in transport
infrastructures.
Prediction and tracking How various existing technologies (e.g. remote sensing,
geospatial technologies) can be used as a tool to predict
vulnerabilities and track the intermodal dispersion of
biological agents?
Design and engineering What are the functional and non-functional requirements for
different engineering controls and how can design and
engineering science inform the optimal balance between air
hygiene and energy efficiency?
Operational effectiveness of protection measure vs cost
effectiveness.
15764 Environ Sci Pollut Res (2016) 23:15757–15766
Acknowledgments The current work has received funding from
EPSRC Grant Reference: EP/G029881/1. The comments from Dr.
Simon Parker (Dstl) and Professor Sean Tyrell (Cranfield University)
are gratefully acknowledged.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link
to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Abubakar I (2010) Tuberculosis and air travel: a systematic review and
analysis of policy. Lancet Infect Dis 10:176–183
Andrews JR, Morrow C, Wood R (2013) Modeling the role of public
transportation in sustaining tuberculosis transmission in South
Africa. Am J Epidemiol 177:556–561
Azimi P, Stephens B (2013) HVAC filtration for controlling infectious
airborne disease transmission in indoor environments: predicting
risk reductions and operational costs. Build Environ 70:150–160
Beyrer K, Lai S, Dreesman J, Lee JV, Joseph C, Harrison T, et al. (2007)
Legionnaires’ disease outbreak associated with a cruise liner,
August 2003: epidemiological and microbiological findings.
Epidemiol Infect 135:802–810
Boyce JM (2016) Modern technologies for improving cleaning and dis-
infection of environmental surfaces in hospitals. Antimicrob Resist
Infect Control 5:10
Brotherton JM, Delpech VC, Gilbert GL, Hatzi S, Paraskevopoulos PD,
McAnulty JM (2003) A large outbreak of influenza A and B on a
cruise ship causing widespread morbidity. Epidemiol Infect 130:
263–271
Buonanno G, Stabile L, Morawska L (2014) Personal exposure to ultra-
fine particles: the influence of time-activity patterns. Sci Total
Environ 468:903–907
Canter DA, Gunning D, Rodgers P, O'Connor L, Traunero C, Kempter CJ
(2005) Remediation of Bacillus anthracis contamination in the US
Department of Justice mail facility. Biosecur Bioterror 32:119–127
Casey AL, Adams D, Karpanen TJ, Lambert PA, Cookson BD,
Nightingale P, et al. (2010) Role of copper in reducing hospital
environment contamination. J Hosp Infect 74:72–77
Canadian Tuberculosis Committee (2007) Housing conditions that serve
as risk factors for tuberculosis infection and disease. Can Commun
Dis Rep 33:1–13
CDC, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2010) Outbreak of
2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) on a Peruvian navy ship—
June-July 2009. Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 59:162–165
Chen F, Yang X, Mak HK, Chan DW (2010) Photocatalytic oxidation for
antimicrobial control in built environment: a brief literature over-
view. Build Environ 45:1747–1754
Cogliati S, Costa JG, Ayala FR, Donato V, Grau R (2016)
Bacterial spores and its relatives as agents of mass destruc-
tion. J Bioterror Biodef 7:141
Conceição T, Diamantino F, Coelho C, de Lencastre H, Aires-de-SousaM
(2013) Contamination of public buses with MRSA in Lisbon,
Portugal: a possible transmission route of major MRSA clones with-
in the community. PLoS One 8:e77812
Copper Development Association (2013) World’s first antimicrobial cop-
per train. Copper Development Association, 5 Grovelands Business
Centre, Boundary Way, Hemel Hempstead, HP2 7TE, UK.
Available at, http://copperalliance.org.uk/docs/librariesprovider3
/press-releases/en-gb/pr888-amc-valparaiso-metro.pdf?sfvrsn=2
Copper Development Association (2014) Copper for infection control at
border control. Copper Development Association, 5 Grovelands
Business Centre, Boundary Way, Hemel Hempstead, HP2 7TE,
UK Ava i l ab l e a t , h t t p : / /www.an t im ic rob i a l coppe r.
org/uk/node/10987
Cui F, Luo H, Zhou L, Yin D, Zheng C, Wang D, et al. (2011)
Transmission of pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus in a train in
China. J Epidemiol 21:271–277
Danzig, R., Sageman,M., Leighton, T., Hough, L., Yuki, H., Kotani, R., et al.
(2012) Aum Shinrikyo insights into how terrorists develop biological
and chemical weapons. Center for a New American Security, 1301
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite 403 Washington, DC 20004
Davies, C. (2007) EPA and nanotechnology: oversight for the 21st cen-
tury. Woodrow Wilson International, Center for Scholars, One
Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20004–3027
DERA (1999) BW and BW defence field trials conducted by the UK:
1940–1979 . DERA /CBD /CR990038 . Ava i l a b e a t ,
http://whatcanidoaboutit.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/uk-bw-
defence-field-trials-1940-1979-mod.pdf
DfT 2013 Department for Transport, National Travel Survey, 2012.
S ta t i s t i ca l Re lease . Ava i l ab le a t , h t tp s : / /www.gov.
uk /government /up loads / sys tem/up loads /a t t achment_
data/file/243957/nts2012-01.pdf
DfT, Department for Transport 2011 London and South East ‘top ten’
overcrowded train services: spring 2011. Available at, http://www.
dft.gov.uk/publications/overcrowded-train-services
Edelson PJ, Phypers M (2011) TB transmission on public transportation:
a review of published studies and recommendations for contact trac-
ing. Travel Med Infect Dis 9:27–31
FHWA (2015) Transportation operations during biohazard events learn-
ing tool. Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department of
Tr a n s po r t a t i o n . Ava i l a b l e a t , h t t p : / /www. i t s . d o t .
gov/eto/docs/transops_biohazard/learning_tool/index2.htm
Furuya H (2007) Risk of transmission of airborne infection during train
commute based on mathematical model. Environ Health Prev Med
12:78–83
Gershon RR, Qureshi KA, Barrera MA, Erwin MJ, Goldsmith F (2005)
Health and safety hazards associated with subways: a review. J
Urban Health 82:10–20
Golub JE, CroninWA, Obasanjo OO, CogginW,Moore K, Pope DS, et al.
(2001) Transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis through casual
contact with an infectious case. Arch Intern Med 161:2254–2258
Gralton J, Tovey E, McLaws ML, Rawlinson WD (2011) The role of
particle size in aerosolised pathogen transmission: a review. J
Infect 62:1–13
Grinshpun SA, Adhikari A, Honda T, Kim KY, Toivola M, Ramchander
Rao KS, Reponen T (2007) Control of aerosol contaminants in
indoor air: combining the particle concentration reduction with mi-
crobial inactivation. Environ Sci Technol 41:606–612
Gunschera J, Markewitz D, Bansen B, Salthammer T, Ding H (2015)
Portable photocatalytic air cleaners: efficiencies and by-product gen-
eration. Environ Sci Pollut Res 23:7482–7493
Hoad, V. C., O’Connor, B. A., Langley, A. J., Dowse, G. K., 2013. Risk
of measles transmission on aeroplanes: Australian experience 2007–
2011. Med J Aust 198, 320–323.
Holmes EC, Rambaut A (2004) Viral evolution and the emergence of
SARS coronavirus. Philos Trans R Soc Lond Ser B Biol Sci 359:
1059–1065
Horna-Campos OJ, Bedoya-Lama A, Romero-Sandoval NC, Martín-
Mateo M (2010) Risk of tuberculosis in public transport sector
workers, Lima, Peru. Int J Tuberc Lung Dis 14:714–719
Horna-Campos OJ, Sánchez-Pérez HJ, Sánchez I, Bedoya A, Martín-
Mateo M (2007) Public transportation and pulmonary tuberculosis,
Lima, Peru. Emerg Infect Dis 13:1491–1493
Environ Sci Pollut Res (2016) 23:15757–15766 15765
Houk VN (1980) Spread of tuberculosis via recirculated air in a naval
vessel: the Byrd study. Ann N YAcad Sci 353:10–24
Jernigan DB, Hofmann J, Cetron MS, Nuorti JP, Fields BS, Benson
RF, et al. (1996) Outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease among
cruise ship passengers exposed to a contaminated whirlpool
spa. Lancet 347:494–499
Joseph CA, Yadav R, Ricketts KD (2007) Travel-associated Legionnaires
disease in Europe in 2007. Euro Surveill 14:1–5
Kak V (2007) Infections in confined spaces: cruise ships, military bar-
racks, and college dormitories. Infect Dis Clin N Am 213:773–784
Kelley ST, Gilbert JA (2013) Studying the microbiology of the indoor
environment. Genome Biol 14:202
Kembel SW, Jones E, Kline J, Northcutt D, Stenson J,WomackAM, et al.
(2012) Architectural design influences the diversity and structure of
the built environment microbiome. ISME J 6:1469–1479
Kembel, S. W., Meadow, J. F., O’Connor, T. K., Mhuireach, G., Northcutt,
D., Kline, J., et. al., 2014. Architectural design drives the biogeogra-
phy of indoor bacterial communities. PLoS One, 9, e87093.
Kowalski WJ (2012) Hospital airborne infection control. CRC Press,
Florida
Kura F, Amemura-Maekawa J, Yagita K, Endo T, IkenoM, Tsuji H, et al.
(2006) Outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease on a cruise ship linked to
spa-bath filter stones contaminated with Legionella pneumophila
serogroup 5. Epidemiol Infect 134:385–391
Lawyer G (2016) Measuring the potential of individual airports for pan-
demic spread over the world airline network. BMC Infect Dis 16:1
Ledler K, Newman E (2005) Respiratory infections during air travel.
Intern Med J 35:50–55
Leitmeyer K (2011) European risk assessment guidance for infectious
diseases transmitted on aircraft—the RAGIDA project. Euro
Surveill 16:16
Li Y, Leung G, Tang J, Yang X, Chao C, Lin J, Lu J, et al. (2007)
Role of ventilation in airborne transmission of infectious agents
in the built environment—a multidisciplinary systematic re-
view. Indoor Air 17:2–18
Lim PL (2011) Influenza and SARS: the impact of viral pandemics on
maritime health. Int Marit Health 62:170–175
Mangili A, Gendreau MA (2005) Transmission of infectious diseases
during commercial air travel. Lancet 365:989–996
Mohr O, Askar M, Schink S, Eckmanns T, Krause G, Poggensee G
(2012) Evidence for airborne infectious disease transmission in pub-
lic ground transport—a literature review. Euro Surveill 17:20255
Moser MR, Bender TR, Margolis HS, Noble GR, Kendal AP, Ritter DG
(1979) An outbreak of influenza aboard a commercial airliner. Am J
Epidemiol 110:1–6
Nardell EA (2016) Indoor environmental control of tuberculosis and oth-
er airborne infections. Indoor Air 26:79–87
Nasir ZA (2014) Environmental heath in built environments. In: Colbeck
I, Lazaridis M (eds) Aerosol science: technology and applications.
John Wiley & Sons Ltd, Chichester, UK, pp. 345–368
Nazaroff WW (2016) Indoor bioaerosol dynamics. Indoor Air 26:61–78
Neumann G, Noda T, Kawaoka Y (2009) Emergence and pandemic po-
tential of swine-origin H1N1 influenza virus. Nature 459:931–939
Okumura T, Takasu N, Ishimatsu S, Miyanoki S, Mitsuhashi A, Kumada
K, et al. (1996) Report on 640 victims of the Tokyo subway sarin
attack. Ann Emerg Med 28:129–135
Page K, Wilson M, Parkin IP (2009) Antimicrobial surfaces and their po-
tential in reducing the role of the inanimate environment in the inci-
dence of hospital-acquired infections. J Mater Chem 19:3819–3831
Perez L, Dragicevic S (2009) An agent-based approach for modeling
dynamics of contagious disease spread. Int J Health Geogr 8:1
Pestre V, Morel B, Encrenaz N, Brunon A, Lucht FD, Pozzetto B,
Berthelot P (2012) Transmission by super-spreading event of pan-
demic A/H1N1 2009 influenza during road and train travel. Scand J
Infect Dis 44:225–227
Pollini M, Paladini F, Licciulli A, Maffezzoli A, Sannino A, Nicolais L
(2013) Antibacterial natural leather for application in the public
transport system. J Coat Technol Res 10:239–245
Schlaich CC, Oldenburg M, Lamshöft MM (2009) Estimating the risk of
communicable diseases aboard cargo ships. J TravelMed 16:402–406
Tarabbo M, Castilletti C, Tommaselli P, Guarducci R, Lucà G (2011)
Retrospective investigation of an influenza A/H1N1pdm outbreak
in an Italian military ship cruising in the Mediterranean Sea, May-
September 2009. PLoS One 6:e15933
Taylor J, Margaritis D, Nasir ZA, Borrion H, Lai KM (2013) The role of
protection measures and their interaction ind building vulnerability
and resilience to bioterrorism. J Bioterr Biodef 4:123
TRB 2013 Infectious disease mitigation in airports and on aircraft. ACRP
Report 91. Transport Research Board, Washington dc 20001. Available
at, http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/acrp/acrp_rpt_091.pdf
Troko, J., P. Myles, J. Gibson, A. Hashim, J. Enstone, S. Kingdon, C., et
al., 2011. Is public transport a risk factor for acute respiratory infec-
tion?. BMC Infec Dis 11,16.
Vera DM, Hora RA,Murillo A,Wong JF, Torre AJ,Wang D, et al. (2014)
Assessing the impact of public health interventions on the transmis-
sion of pandemic H1N1 influenza A virus aboard a Peruvian navy
ship. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 8:353–359
Verhougstraete M, Reynolds K (2016) Use of a portable air disinfecting
system to remove seeded coliphage in hospital rooms. Am J Infect
Control 44:714–715
Wanyeki I, Olson S, Brassard P, Menzies D, Ross N, Behr M,
Schwartzman K (2006) Dwellings, crowding, and tuberculosis in
Montreal. Soc Sci Med 63:501–511
Ward KA, Armstrong P, McAnulty JM, Iwasenko JM, Dwyer DE (2010)
Outbreaks of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and seasonal influenza A
(H3N2) on cruise ship. Emerg Infect Dis 16:1731–1737
Wei X, Yang Z, Tay SL, Gao W (2014) Photocatalytic TiO2 nanoparticles
enhanced polymer antimicrobial coating. Appl Surf Sci 290:274–279
WHO (2005) International health regulations. WHO Press, World Health
Organization, 20 Avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
WHO (2008) Tuberculosis and air travel: guidelines for prevention and
control—3rd ed. World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia,
1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
WHO 2014 Global tuberculosis report 2014. World Health Organization,
20 Avenue Appia, 1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
WHO 2013 Pandemic influenza risk management WHO interim guid-
ance. WHO Press, World Health Organization, 20 Avenue Appia,
1211 Geneva 27, Switzerland
Yang Y, Atkinson P, Ettema D (2008) Individual space–time activity-
based modelling of infectious disease transmission within a city. J
R Soc Interface 5:759–772
Young N, Pebody R, Smith G, Olowokure B, Shankar G, Hoschler K, et al.
(2014) International flight-related transmission of pandemic influenza A
(H1N1) pdm09: an historical cohort study of the first identified cases in
the United Kingdom. Influenza Other Respir Viruses 81:66–73
Zhang L, Li Y (2012) Dispersion of coughed droplets in a fully-occupied
high-speed rail cabin. Build Environ 47:58–66
Zhang N,Huang H, DuarteM, Zhang JJ (2016) Dynamic population flow
based risk analysis of infectious disease propagation in a metropolis.
Environ Int. doi:10.1016/j.envint.2016.03.038
Zhang Y, Mo J, Li Y, Sundell J, Wargocki P, Zhang J, et al. (2011) Can
commonly-used fan-driven air cleaning technologies improve in-
door air quality? A literature review. Atmos Environ 45:4329–4343
Zhao B, Ni S, Yong N,MaX, Shen S, Ji X (2015) A preliminary study on
spatial spread risk of epidemics by analyzing the urban subway
mobility data. J Biosci Med 3:15–21
Zuraimi MS, Nilsson GJ, Magee RJ (2011) Removing indoor particles
using portable air cleaners: implications for residential infection
transmission. Build Environ 46:2512–2519
15766 Environ Sci Pollut Res (2016) 23:15757–15766
